Daily salary IMG 0077 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

On Thursday, the Sixth District held that a compensation system based solely on the number of hours worked, with no guaranteed minimum cannot be considered a salary, and therefore cannot serve as the basis for an exempt classification.  Negri v. Koning & Associates, No. H037804, __ Cal. App. 4th __ (6th Dist. May 16, 2013).  California Labor Code § 515(a) requires that to be exempt, the employee must earn a “monthly salary equivalent to no less than two times the state minimum wage for full-time employment.”

Plaintiff is an insurance claims adjuster who was paid $29 per hour with no minimum guarantee.  Slip Op. at 1.  When he worked more than 40 hours in a week, he was still paid at $29 per hour.  He brought a claim for overtime pay, and the trial court issued a defense verdict, concluding that plaintiff was an exempt employee.  Id. at 3.

Defendant argued that plaintiff was properly classified as exempt because plaintiff’s workload was not subject to reduction or variation, and he worked substantially the same number of hours each week of his employment.  In other words, defendant argued that even though it paid plaintiff by the hour, because there was always enough work to occupy him for 60 hours per week, the resulting compensation was a salary because it did not vary.  Defendant further maintained that “some sort of reduction in workload” must actually occur in order for an employee to lose his exemption.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, even though plaintiff always received an unvarying minimum amount of pay in practice:

We recognize that, in practice, defendant always paid plaintiff the equivalent $29 per hour for 40 hours per week so that he, in effect, received an unvarying minimum amount of pay. We also recognize that, as a general matter, an exempt employee may be paid extra for extra work without losing the exemption. (See Kennedy, supra, 410 F.3d at p. 371.) The problem here is that defendant stipulated to the fact that it “never paid [plaintiff] a guaranteed salary”; if he worked fewer claims “he made less money than if he worked more claims.” That is the same thing as saying that plaintiff was not paid “a predetermined amount” that “was not subject to reduction based upon the quantity of work performed.” He was not paid a salary. For that reason, defendant did not prove that the administrative exemption of Wage Order 4 applies in this case.

Slip Op. at 8-9.

Judges & Attorneys

Associate Justice Eugene M. Premo delivered the opinion for the Court, with Presiding Justice Conrad L. Rushing and Associate Justice Franklin D. Elia concurring.

Appeal from judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, Hon. Socrates P. Manoukian.

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant: Ari Moss, Dennis F. Moss

Counsel for Defendant/Respondent: Michael A. Bishop, N. Kate Jeffries.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

Coco-park-security-guard (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

On Friday, the Fourth District reversed the denial of a certification of a meal and rest break class of security guards.  Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc., No. G041702, __ Cal. App. 4th. __ (4th Dist. May 10, 2013).  The court reconsidered in light of the California Supreme Court decision in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.4th 1004 (2012), and concluded that the primary issue was the legality of certain company policies, which could be determined on a class-wide basis, even if the application of the policies varied by individual. More later.

Judges & Attorneys

Justice Richard D. Fybel delivered the opinion for the court.  Acting Presiding Justice William F. Rylaarsdam and Associate Justice Eileen C. Moore concurred.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gail Andrea Andler, Judge.

Saltzman, Stanley D. Saltzman, Christina A. Humphrey, Craig Pynes; Class Action Litigation Group, Renee L. Barge; Law Office of Lawrence A. Witsoe, Lawrence A. Witsoe; White & Roseman and Leslie Roseman for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

LightGabler, Jonathan Fraser Light and Angela V. Lopez for Defendant and Respondent.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

English: Color logo of the National Labor Relations Board, an independent agency of the United States federal government. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

A panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit yesterday struck down the NLRB’s rule requiring employers to post an employee rights poster informing employees of their rights under the NLRA to unionize, among other things.  National Association of Manufacturers v. National Labor Relations Board, No. 12-5068, __ F.3d __ (D.C. Cir. May 7, 2013).  The court reasoned that the rule violated employers’ free speech rights and was, therefore, unlawful.  ”The right to disseminate another’s speech necessarily includes the right to decide not to disseminate it.”  Slip Op. at 17.

We therefore conclude that the Board’s rule violates § 8(c) because it makes an employer’s failure to post the Board’s notice an unfair labor practice, and because it treats such a failure as evidence of anti-union animus in cases involving, for example, unlawfully motivated firings or refusals to hire—in other words, because it treats such a failure as evidence of an unfair labor practice.19 See Brown & Root, Inc. v. NLRB, 333 F.3d 628, 637–39 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2003).

Slip Op. at 23.  You can read the decision here.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

Deposition of Mary Walcott, August 3, 1692 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The Second District issued a pair of interesting non-wage opinions this week:

• Yesterday, citing the absence of “subject matter jurisdiction”, the Second District held that that a non-noticing party in a deposition, who does not move for an order in the pending case for a determination of the “reasonable rate” a court reporter may charge, may not bring a subsequent action to obtain restitution or obtain injunctive relief.  The Las Canoas Company, Inc. v. Kramer, No. B238729, __ Cal. App. 4th. __ (2d Dist. May 7, 2013).  The court further concluded that “absent extraordinary circumstances, the court in the action in which the dispute arises is the only court to resolve the issue.” Slip Op. at 4 (emphasis supplied).  You can read more here.
• On Monday, the Second District reversed a dismissal of a former deputy sheriff.  Shirey v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department), No. B238355, __ Cal. App. 4th __ (May 6, 2013).  You can read about it here.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

Collective Bargaining Bill Signing (Photo credit: Office of Governor Patrick)

The Second District today issued its ruling in Choate v. Celite Corporation, No. B239160, __ Cal. App. 4th __ (2d Dist. May 2, 2013).  The case involved Labor Code section 227.3, which provides for full payment of vested vacation time upon termination:

Unless otherwise provided by a collective-bargaining agreement, whenever a contract of employment or employer policy provides for paid vacations, and an employee is terminated without having taken off his vested vacation time, all vested vacation shall be paid to him as wages at his final rate in accordance with such contract of employment or employer policy respecting eligibility or time served; provided, however, that an employment contract or employer policy shall not provide for forfeiture of vested vacation time upon termination. . . .

(Emphasis supplied.)

The court rejected an implied waiver standard and held that for the collective bargaining agreement exception to apply, the CBA must clearly and unmistakably waive the right to immediate payment:

We hold that a collective bargaining agreement “otherwise provide[s]” and thereby abrogates an employee’s statutory right under section 227.3 to immediate payment for vested vacation time only if the agreement clearly and unmistakably waives that right. Because the agreement in this case lacked this clarity, Celite Corporation (Celite) was required to immediately pay terminated employees for all their vested vacation time. We nevertheless reverse the trial court’s judgment imposing waiting time penalties because Celite’s nonpayment was not “willful.”

(Emphasis supplied.)

Judges & Attorneys

Judge Brian M. Hoffstadt (sitting pro-tem) issued the opinion for the court, with Presiding Justice Arthur Gilbert and Associate Justice Steven Z. Perren concurring.

Trial Court: Hon. James W. Brown and Hon. Donna D. Geck of Santa Barbara County Superior Court.

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, Jeffrey A. Dinkin and Karin Dougan Vogel for Defendant and Appellant.

Gilbert & Sackman, Robert A. Cantore and Adrian Barnes for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

My new lateness reminder… (Photo credit: adityasen)

The Second District issued its ruling today in Duchrow v. Forrest, __ Cal. App. 4th __, No. B233736 (2d Dist. Apr. 30, 2013).  The panel held that the lower court abused its discretion by permitting an amendment to a complaint on the fourth day of a five-day trial, where there was no reason the amendment could not have been made sooner.  The court found prejudice because, inter alia, the damages sought changed from $44,082.22, as pleaded in the complaint, to $312,260 in attorney fees.   You can read more here.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

Ford Motor Company of Canada Limited, St. Thomas Assembly Plant – Cars Stored at St. Thomas Municipal Airport, 1978 (Photo credit: Elgin County Archives)

The Second District yesterday ordered published Khani v. Ford Motor Company, et al., No. B239611, __ Cal.App.4th __ (2d Dist. Apr. 25, 2013).   Plaintiff’s attorney in a lemon law case previously worked at a law firm that represented defendant, reportedly provided unspecified “input” to defendant and communicated regularly with defendant about lemon law cases.  The trial court disqualified plaintiff’s counsel.  The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that:

The evidence in this case does not establish that any information to which Shahian was exposed during his representation of Ford would be material to his representation of Khani in this case. While Ford presented evidence that Shahian represented it in California Lemon Law cases, it did not establish that any confidential information about the defense in those cases would be at issue in this case.

You can read more here.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

English: War poster : Women are Working Day and Night to Win the War / Witherby & Co. London. Français : Affiche de guerre : Les femmes travaillent jour et nuit pour gagner la guerre (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

A pair of interesting, non-wage, employment decisions were issued today: one from the Ninth Circuit and the other from the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District.

• In California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation v. State Personnel Board (Moya), No. D061653, __ Cal. App. 4th __ (4th Dist. April 26, 2013).  The court considered whether the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, Gov. Code § 3300, et seq., excepts internal workers’ compensation fraud investigations from the one-year limitations period established in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1).  The court concluded that it does and affirmed the judgment.
• In Petersen v. Boeing Company, No. 11-18075, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2013), a district court dismissed plaintiff’s case on the basis of a Saudi forum selection clause without holding an evidentiary hearing as to whether plaintiff was induced to assent to the forum selection clause through fraud or overreaching.  The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the forum selection clause was enforceable.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

Sometimes money is a powerful incentive. (Photo credit: wayneandwax)

The Ninth Circuit today reversed a trial court’s approval of a class action settlement against credit reporting agencies under the Fair Credit Report Act, citing a failure by the class representatives and class counsel to adequately represent the class.  Radcliffe, et al v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., et al., Case No. 11-56376, __ F.3d __ (Apr. 22, 2013).  The court took issue with the incentive awards to the class representatives that were conditioned on the class representatives’ support for the settlement.  The court reasoned that these conditional awards caused a divergence of interests between the representatives and the class:

These conditional incentive awards caused the interests of the class representatives to diverge from the interests of the class because the settlement agreement told class representatives that they would not receive incentive awards unless they supported the settlement.

You can read more here.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

Handbook (Photo credit: Jeff Hester)

The Second District ordered published today an opinion reversing the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc., et al., No. B237363, __ Cal. App. 4th __ (filed Mar. 21, 2013, modified Apr. 19, 2013).  The case involved an agreement to arbitrate that was non-mutual, but which referenced an employee handbook’s arbitration clause.

At the trial court level, the court denied defendants’  motion to compel arbitration, finding the agreement to arbitrate lacked mutuality.  Defendants argued that the requisite mutuality was provided by the bilateral arbitration provisions in the employee handbook, incorporated by reference into the arbitration agreement.  The trial court rejected this argument because defendant could change the handbook at its sole discretion and without notice.  The Second District reversed.

Because the agreement incorporated the arbitration policy in the employee handbook, the Court concluded that this “salvages the agreement by establishing an unmistakable mutual obligation on the part of [employer and plaintiff] to arbitrate ‘any dispute’ arising out of her employment.”  Plaintiff argued that the while the arbitration policy in the handbook establishes a bilateral obligation to arbitrate, she insisted that the mutual obligation is illusory because, the employer is authorized to alter the terms of any policy contained in the handbook at its sole discretion and without notice.  The Court disagreed, reasoning that the right to alter the terms was limited by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract.

You can read more here.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

English: Admission of the Senior Wrangler in 1842 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed on Monday a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration.  Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler, et al., No. B237044, __ Cal.App.4th __ (2d Dist. Apr. 15, 2013), where some defendants moved to compel arbitration, but the remaining defendants did not.  Slip Op. at 2.  The trial court denied on the grounds of waiver and the possibility of inconsistent rulings.

Moving defendants sought a reversal, arguing that plaintiff’s complaint alleged that all defendants are agents of one another, and that allegation is a binding judicial admission that gives the non-moving defendants the right to enforce the arbitration agreement.  The court disagreed, noting that:

[N]ot every factual allegation in a complaint automatically constitutes a judicial admission.  Otherwise, a plaintiff would conclusively establish the facts of the case by merely alleging them, and there would never be any disputed facts to be tried. . . . A judicial admission is therefore conclusive both as to the admitting party and as to that party’s opponent. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 454, p. 587.) Thus, if a factual allegation is treated as a judicial admission, then neither party may attempt to contradict it—the admitted fact is effectively conceded by both sides.

Here, the moving defendants sought to reserve the right to argue at arbitration that the allegation of mutual agency was false, and thus it was not conceded by both sides.

Although the Kessler defendants frame their argument using the term “judicial admission” and rely on case law concerning judicial admissions, their counsel confirmed at oral argument that they do not in fact wish to treat Barsegian‟s allegation of mutual agency as a judicial admission, because the Kessler defendants do wish to be able to contest the truth of that allegation, either in court or before an arbitrator. That is, the Kessler defendants wish to hold Barsegian to the mutual agency allegation only for purposes of the motion to compel arbitration, but, should they succeed in compelling arbitration on the basis of that allegation, they wish to retain the right to prove to the arbitrator that the allegation is false. That is not how judicial admissions operate.

You can read more here.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

Official portrait of Justice (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an FLSA collective action was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, where the lead plaintiff ignored the employer’s offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68.  Genesis Healthcare Corp., et al. v. Symczyk, No. 11-1059, 569 U.S. __ (April 16, 2013).

Plaintiff brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and Genesis Healthcare Corp. promptly made an offer of judgment under F.R.C.P. 68.  The District Court found that the Rule 68 offer fully satisfied plaintiff’s claim and that no other individuals had joined her suit, and it dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Third Circuit reversed.

Justice Thomas, writing for the 5-4 majority, concluded that:

Reaching the question on which we granted certiorari,we conclude that respondent has no personal interest in representing putative, unnamed claimants, nor any other continuing interest that would preserve her suit from mootness. Respondent’s suit was, therefore, appropriately dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

More later.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

ProfWhiteboard_Injunctions (Photo credit: cali.org)

Abigail Rubenstein of Law360 published an article Friday quoting the blog author’s analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s recent en banc ruling in Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A.  Kilgore v. Keybank, N.A., No. 09-16703, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2013) (en banc):

Employers who were hoping that the full court would adopt the original appellate panel in the case’s flat-out rejection of the Broughton-Cruz rule may be disappointed, but the narrower en banc decision will still likely prove useful to businesses trying to enforce their arbitration agreements in employment disputes, lawyers told Law360.

“The decision left open the question of the viability of the Broughton-Cruz rule, but the reasoning of the court at the end of the day might please the defense bar more than the plaintiffs bar because although the Ninth Circuit sidestepped the continued viability of the rule, what it did say was that to extent that an exception [to the FAA] for public injunctive relief exists, it is quite a narrow one,” Charles Jung of Nassiri & Jung LLP said.

And employers facing Private Attorney General Act claims, which plaintiffs often argue fit into that exception, can seize on the appeals court’s narrow construction to make the case that the claims should be sent to an arbitrator, employment defense lawyers said.

Threatened Class Action Against Second Life Brautigan & Tuck Holdings (Photo credit: TaranRampersad)

In a wage and hour class action, Bush v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., No. 11-16892, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2013), a Ninth Circuit panel today affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of warehouse workers’ claims for unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Nevada state law.  The court reversed the dismissal of state law claims on the basis that they would be certified using different class certification procedures than the federal wage-and-hour claims.  Agreeing with other circuits, the panel held that a FLSA collective action and a state law class action are not inherently incompatible as a matter of law even though plaintiffs must opt into a collective action under the FLSA but must opt out of a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Our sister circuits have correctly reasoned that FLSA’s plain text does not suggest that a district court must dismiss a state law claim that would be certified using an opt-out procedure. Its opt-in requirement extends only to “any such action” – that is, a FLSA claim. . . . Nor does the legislative history of Section 216(b) support the view of some district courts that allowing both actions to proceed simultaneously “would essentially nullify Congress’s intent in crafting Section 216(b) and eviscerate the purpose of Section 216(b)’s opt-in requirement.”

Judges

Before: Jerome Farris, Sidney R. Thomas, and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Thomas.

The case was argued and submitted at Stanford Law School.

Attorneys

Mark R. Thierman, Jason J. Kuller, Joshua D. Buck (argued), Thierman Law Firm, P.C., Reno, Nevada, for Plaintiffs- Appellants.

Rick D. Roskelley (argued), Roger L. Grandgenett II, Cory Glen Walker, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Las Vegas, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellee.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The Ninth Circuit’s en banc ruling yesterday in Kilgore v.Keybank, N.A. (you can read more here) was a decidedly restrained opinion.  The court could certainly have held, as many expected, that the Broughton-Cruz public injunction exception to the general rule that the “FAA requires state courts to honor arbitration agreements” does not stand in light of Concepcion, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s reaction to state courts taking a narrow read of Concepcion.

But while some reports justifiably see Kilgore as a narrow victory for the plaintiff’s bar, the Ninth Circuit arguably took a narrow read of the public injunction exception.  The court held that the claim for injunctive relief fell outside Broughton-Cruz because the “requested prohibitions against reporting defaults on the Note and seeking enforcement of the Note plainly would benefit only the approximately 120 putative class members.”  Slip op. at 17 (emphasis supplied).

In Kilgore, defendant withdrew from the private school loan business, and accordingly the court concluded that the “injunctive relief sought thus, for all practical purposes, relates only to past harms suffered by the members of the limited putative class.”

The central premise of Broughton-Cruz is that “the judicial forum has significant institutional advantages over arbitration in administering a public injunctive remedy, which as a consequence will likely lead to the diminution or frustration of the public benefit if the remedy is entrusted to arbitrators.” Broughton, 988 P.2d at 78. That concern is absent here, where Defendants’ alleged statutory violations have, by Plaintiffs’ own admission, already ceased, where the class affected by the alleged practices is small, and where there is no real prospective benefit to the public at large from the relief sought.

This suggests an argument for defendants in class action cases where there is a mandatory arbitration agreement: where the company has stopped an alleged unlawful practice, and the proposed private attorney general action affects only the class members, then a defendant might argue that the Broughton-Cruz rule does not apply.  It’s worth noting that 120 putative class members is not an unusually small class in an employment case, and if the Ninth Circuit sees a class of that size as only a “limited putative class”, then it might arguably see many wage and hour cases as affecting only a limited portion of the public.

If this is a victory for the plaintiff’s bar, it is indeed a very narrow one.  And it highlights the importance of the California Supreme Court’s upcoming decision in Iskanian.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

Wright brothers flying over the Kohn plantation in Montgomery, Alabama, where they set up a flying school. Maxwell Air Force Base was later built on the site. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The Ninth Circuit took a narrow approach in a ruling which had been expected to  have implications for wage & hour class actions.  The en banc court today compelled arbitration in Kilgore v. Keybank, National Association, but declined to issue a broad holding vitiating the Broughton-Cruz rule.  Kilgore v. Keybank, National Association, No. 09-16703, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2013) (en banc).  The appeal involved a putative class action by former students of a failed flight-training school who seek broad injunctive relief against the bank that originated their student loans among others.  The en banc court held that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable under California law and reversed and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration.

The court concluded that the injunctive relief claim at issue fell outside Broughton-Cruz’s “narrow exception to the rule that the FAA requires state courts to honor arbitration agreements.”

The central premise of Broughton-Cruz is that “the judicial forum has significant institutional advantages over arbitration in administering a public injunctive remedy, which as a consequence will likely lead to the diminution or frustration of the public benefit if the remedy is entrusted to arbitrators.” Broughton, 988 P.2d at 78. That concern is absent here, where Defendants’ alleged statutory violations have, by Plaintiffs’ own admission, already ceased, where the class affected by the alleged practices is small, and where there is no real prospective benefit to the public at large from the relief sought.

You can read more about today’s ruling here.

Attorneys

Andrew A. August and Kevin F. Rooney, Pinnacle Law Group, LLP; James C. Sturdevant (argued) and Whitney Huston, The Sturdevant Law Firm, San Francisco, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellees/Appellants.

W. Scott O’Connell (argued), Courtney Q. Brooks, and Kristen M. Yasenka, Nixon Peabody LLP, Manchester, New Hampshire; Matthew A. Richard, Todd C. Toral, and Stephanie Karnavas, Nixon Peabody LLP, San Francisco, California, for Defendants-Appellants/Appellees.

David Horton, Davis, California; Hiro N. Aragaki, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae Law Professors. Hiro N. Aragaki and David Doeling, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae Arbitration Professors.

Donald M. Falk, Mayer Brown LLP, Palo Alto, California; Andrew J. Pincus (argued), Evan M. Tager, Archis A. Parasharami, and Scott M. Noveck, Mayer Brown LLP; Robin S. Conrad and Kate Comerford Todd, National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc., Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America.

Steve Bullock and Kelley L. Hubbard, Office of the Montana Attorney General, Helena, Montana, for Amicus Curiae State of Montana.

Arthur D. Levy; Nancy Barron, Kemnitzer, Barron & Krieg LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amicus Curiae The National Association of Consumer Advocates and The National Consumer Law Center.

Ellen Lake, Oakland, California; Terisa E. Chaw, The Employee Rights Advocacy Institute for Law & Policy; Rebecca M. Hamburg, National Employment Lawyers Association; Cliff Palefsky, McGuinn, Hillsman & Palefsky, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae National Employment Lawyers Association, The Employee Rights Advocacy Institute for Law & Policy, and California Employment Lawyers Association.

Mark A. Chavez, Chavez & Gertler LLP, Mill Valley, California, for Amicus Curiae The National Consumer Law Center, National Association ofConsumer Advocates, Public Citizen and National Consumers League.

C. Dawn Causey and Gregory F. Taylor, American Bankers Association, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae American Bankers Association, Consumer Bankers Association, and the Clearing House Association, L.L.C.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

mercedes-driver at it’s best (Photo credit: *MarS)

Today the Second District ordered published Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, et al., Case No. B235292, __ Cal. App. 4th __ (2d Dist. Mar. 6, 2013).  Gonzalez is a wage and hour class action where the question presented was whether California’s minimum wage law requires an employer that compensates its automotive service technicians on a “piece-rate” basis for repair work must also pay those technicians a separate hourly minimum wage for time spent during their work shifts waiting for vehicles to repair or performing other non-repair tasks directed by the employer.  Defendant automobile dealership contended it was not required to pay the technicians a separate hourly minimum wage for such time because it ensured that a technician’s total compensation for a pay period never fell below what the employer refers to as the “minimum wage floor” — the total number of hours the technician was at work during the pay period (including hours spent waiting for repair work or performing non-repair tasks), multiplied by the applicable minimum wage rate.  The employer supplemented pay, if necessary, to cover any shortfall.

The Court of Appeal concluded that class members were entitled to separate hourly compensation for time spent waiting for repair work or performing other non-repair tasks directed by the employer during their work shifts, as well as penalties under Labor Code section 203, subdivision (a).

The Court also affirmed the award of waiting time penalties in the amount of $237,840.

There is substantial evidence in the record to support an implied finding of willfulness. Although DTLA stated that its policy was to supplement its technicians’ pay when flag hour compensation fell below the minimum wage floor, there was evidence that DTLA did not always follow this policy. DTLA’s expert witness testified that he reviewed technicians’ pay records and found instances when DTLA failed to cover shortfalls between piece-rate wages and the minimum wage floor. DTLA’s failure to do so was a sufficient basis for the imposition of penalties under Labor Code section 203. The trial court accordingly did not err by awarding such penalties.

Judges and Attorneys

Associate Justice Victoria M. Chavez wrote the opinion for the court, with Presiding Justice Roger W. Boren and Associate Justice Judith Ashmann-Gerst concurring.  Appeal was taken from a judgment of Hon. Mary H. Strobel of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

Dickstein Shapiro, Arthur F. Silbergeld and Jennifer A. Awrey; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robin Meadow, Cynthia E. Tobisman, and Alana H. Rotter for Defendants and Appellants.

Gartenberg Gelfand Hayton & Selden and Aaron C. Gundzik; Law Offices of Neal J. Fialkow and Neal J. Fialkow for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Curiale Hirschfeld Kraemer LLP and Felicia R. Reid for National Automobile Dealers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Nossaman LLP and John T. Kennedy for California Automotive Business Coalition as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Fine, Boggs & Perkins LLP, John P. Boggs and David J. Reese for California New Car Dealers Association and Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Altshuler Berzon LLP, Eve H. Cervantez and Eileen B. Goldsmith for California Employment Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

Car Sales USA (Photo credit: emilio labrador)

Yesterday, the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District reversed a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration.  See Vasquez v. Greene Motors, Inc., et al., Case No. A134829, __ Cal.App.4th __ (1st Dist. Mar. 27, 2013).  The arbitration agreement related to the purchase of a used car on credit from defendants, but the opinion has implications for wage & hour class actions because the agreement contained a class waiver and the requirement to arbitration “public” claims.  Id. at 25-26.

The court found only minimal procedural unconscionability, but an absence of significant substantive unconsionability.  The arbitration clause was printed on the reverse side of a form contract, but the buyer was alerted to the presence of the clause.  The Court described the clause as follows:

The reverse side, also dense with text, contains a number of provisions in separate boxes, many dealing with typical ―boilerplate legal matters, such as warranties, applicable law, and buyer and seller remedies. None of the provisions on the back page requires a buyer‘s signature. Toward the bottom of the page is the arbitration clause. The entire text of the clause is outlined in a black border. In all capital letters and bold type at the top is written, ―ARBITRATION CLAUSE [¶] PLEASE REVIEW— IMPORTANT—AFFECTS YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS. Immediately below, three numbered provisions, also in all capital letters, inform the buyer either party may request arbitration, this would prevent a court or class-wide proceeding, and it might limit discovery. Below these, in smaller type, are the actual terms of the clause. Pursuant to these terms, the arbitration may be conducted under the auspices of the National Arbitration Forum or the American Arbitration Association (AAA), at the election of the buyer, or by any other mutually agreeable organization; the initial arbitration will be conducted by a single arbitrator; it will occur in the federal district of the buyer‘s residence; the seller must advance up to $2,500 of the buyer‘s arbitration costs; the award is binding unless it is $0 or more than $100,000 or includes injunctive relief, in which 4 case either party can request a second arbitration before three arbitrators; and the use of self-help remedies and small claims court is exempted.

Because the Court found the agreement to be only minimally procedurally unconscionable, it required a substantial degree of substantive unconscionability to defeat the clause.   It validated the presence of a class action waiver and requirement to arbitrate public claims, finding the arguments against each “foreclosed” by Concepcion:

Finally, Vasquez argues the waiver of class action rights and the requirement to arbitrate ―public claims, such as the statutory violations alleged here, are impermissible. (See Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 148 (Discover Bank); Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303.) Both arguments have been foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 131 S.Ct. 1740 (Concepcion), which found preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). (See Phillips v. Sprint PCS (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 758, 769; Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 26 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1136–1137.) Although Concepcion expressly considered only Discover Bank‘s judicially created ban on class action waivers as unconscionable, the same rationale would require a finding of preemption of the statutory ban on class action waivers in section 1751, which is similarly based on public policy.

Judges & Attorneys

Justice Margulies wrote the opinion for the court, and Justices Dondero and Banke concurred.  The trial court judge was Hon. Robert S. Bowers of Solano County Superior Court

Toschi, Sidran, Collins & Doyle, David R. Sidran and Thomas M. Crowell for Defendants and Appellants.

Rosner, Barry & Babbitt, Hallen D. Rosner, Christopher P. Barry and Angela J. Smith for Plaintiff and Respondent.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

Comcast Cables (Photo credit: dmuth)

In a class action ruling that may impact employers’ attacks on wage & hour class certification motions, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 5 to 4 ruling today reversing certification of a proposed antitrust class action.  See Comcast Corp., et al. v. Behrend, et al., No. 11-864, 569 U.S. ___ (Mar. 27, 2013).  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, concluded that the class was improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(3) because plaintiff’s damages model fell short of establishing that damages can be measured classwide.  The District Court and Third Circuit approved certification of a class of more than 2 million current and former Comcast subscribers who sought damages for alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws.

At the trial court level, plaintiffs proposed four theories of antitrust impact, only one of which–the “overbuilder” theory–the trial court accepted.  To establish damages, plaintiffs relied solely on the testimony of Dr. James McClave, who designed a regression model comparing actual cable prices in one area with hypothetical prices that would have prevailed but for defendant’s allegedly anticompetitive practices.  Dr. McClave acknowledged that the model did not isolate damages resulting from any one theory of antitrust impact.  Id. at 4.

The Supreme Court held that the class was improperly certified.

By refusing to entertain arguments against respondents’ damages model that bore on the propriety of class certification, simply because those arguments would also be pertinent to the merits determination, the Court of Appeals ran afoul of our precedents requiring precisely that inquiry. And it is clear that, under the proper standard for evaluating certification, respondents’ model falls far short of establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis. Without presenting another methodology, respondents cannot show Rule 23(b)(3) predominance: Questions of individual damage  calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.

The Court reasoned that the “model failed to measure damages resulting from the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners’ liability in this action is premised.”  Id. at 8.  Justice Scalia emphasized that ”it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question, . . . Such an analysis will frequently entail overlap with the merits of the plaintiff ’s underlying claim.” Id. at 6 (internal quotations omitted).

By CHARLES H. JUNG

California Supreme Court (Photo credit: Jamison Wieser)

Law360 published an article today quoting the blog author’s analysis of the Compton v. Superior Court case.  Compton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. B236669, — Cal.Rptr.3d —-, 2013 WL 1120619 (2d Dist. Mar 19, 2013):

“In both cases, the First and Second districts applied Armendariz and invalidated arbitration agreements for lack of mutuality,” said Charles Jung, a Nassiri & Jung LLP attorney. “At least as far as California courts are concerned, Armendariz is alive and well, and it appears that this is going to continue to be the case until the California Supreme Court overrules it.”

In light of the latest ruling, plaintiffs and their attorneys looking to defeat mandatory arbitration agreements will keep an eagle eye out for any type of one-sidedness, according to Jung.

“The Compton ruling creates an avenue for employees to argue that mandatory agreements are unlawfully one-sided and that under Armendariz, they should be stricken,” he said. “For employers, it suggests the way to make arbitration agreements enforceable is by making them simple and even-handed. Employers can’t have their cake and eat it too.”

“The California Supreme Court really has its work cut out for it,” Jung said. “The challenge for the California Supreme Court is to try to preserve what it can of California’s public policy, yet not fall afoul of and directly contradict or simply ignore the U.S. Supreme Court. It’s a very tricky position for the court to be in.”