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Posts Tagged ‘FLSA’

U.S. Supreme Court Holds That Unaccepted FLSA Pick-Off Offer Deprives Court of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In Collective Action, FLSA, Pick-off Offer on April 16, 2013 at 4:51 pm
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Official portrait of Justice (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an FLSA collective action was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, where the lead plaintiff ignored the employer’s offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68.  Genesis Healthcare Corp., et al. v. Symczyk, No. 11-1059, 569 U.S. __ (April 16, 2013).

Plaintiff brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and Genesis Healthcare Corp. promptly made an offer of judgment under F.R.C.P. 68.  The District Court found that the Rule 68 offer fully satisfied plaintiff’s claim and that no other individuals had joined her suit, and it dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Third Circuit reversed.

Justice Thomas, writing for the 5-4 majority, concluded that:

Reaching the question on which we granted certiorari,we conclude that respondent has no personal interest in representing putative, unnamed claimants, nor any other continuing interest that would preserve her suit from mootness. Respondent’s suit was, therefore, appropriately dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

More later.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Basing a UCL Claim Partially on FLSA Violation Does Not Confer Federal Question Jurisdiction

In Federal Question Jurisdiction, FLSA, Remand on August 15, 2010 at 8:00 am

Photo by Bryan Maleszyk

Judge Percy Anderson of the Central District of California faced the question of whether basing a UCL claim partially on a violation of the FSLA creates federal jurisdiction.  The Court held that it did not.  The case is Williams, et al. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV 10-4761 PA (PJWx), 2010 WL 3184248 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010).

Plaintiffs’ alleged that defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Defendant”) misclassified them as exempt from overtime and failed to pay wages for overtime compensation.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant as “Home Mortgage Consultants” sometime between February 10, 2001 and the present. During that time, Plaintiffs were paid on a commission sales basis and were never paid any overtime or premium pay. On May 30, 2010, Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, alleging (1) violation California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198 for unpaid overtime; (2) violation of California Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802 for unpaid business expenses; (3) violation California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 for wages not timely paid upon termination; (4) violation California Labor Code § 204 for wages not timely paid during employment; (5) violation California Labor Code § 226(a) for non-compliant wage statements; and (6) violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.

Defendant filed a Notice of Removal on June 28, 2010, alleging federal question jurisdiction.  Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand, maintaining that they have only alleged state law claims, and thus there is no basis for subject matter jurisdiction.

Defendant contended that Plaintiffs have effectively alleged a separate federal claim by alleging violation of the UCL based on violation of the FLSA.

Defendant is asking that this Court treat UCL claims and the violations upon which they are based as one in the same. However, Defendant has not cited, and the Court has not found, any authority which supports this position. Indeed, Defendant’s view seems to directly contradict the California Supreme Court‘s characterization of the UCL as a statute that “borrows” violations of other laws and makes them “independently actionable.” Accordingly, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs have somehow alleged a federal cause of action by basing their UCL claim in part on Defendant’s alleged violation of FLSA.

Defendant also contended that because most of Plaintiffs’ claims stem from their allegations that Defendant misclassified them as exempt from overtime compensation, and Plaintiffs’ overtime claim is entirely dependent on an interpretation of the FLSA, the resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims depends upon the resolution of whether Defendant violated the FLSA.  The court was not persuaded.

Although Defendant is correct in noting that most of Plaintiffs’ claims stem from allegations that Defendant improperly classified them as exempt, there is no indication in the complaint that this misclassification is based on exemptions set forth in federal law, as opposed to California law. . . . Where a plaintiff has alleged a UCL claim based on both the violation of state and federal law, courts have found that federal question jurisdiction does not exist. See, e.g., Holliman v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14627 at *13 (N.D. Cal. March 14, 2006) (finding no federal question jurisdiction where UCL claim was based on violations of California Labor Code and FLSA); Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. 165 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1067 (N.D. Cal. April 11, 2001) (finding no federal question jurisdiction where UCL claim was based on “unfair” misrepresentations and violation of the National Association of Securities Dealers rules); Castro v. Providian Nat’l Bank, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19062 at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2000) (finding that even if plaintiffs were basing UCL claim on violation of federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) in addition to violations of California law, claim did not depend on question of federal law because jury could find violation of section 17200 without finding violation of TILA).

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged a UCL claim based on a number of “unlawful” acts, which include two FLSA violations in addition to nine violations of the California Labor Code. Because a single unlawful business practice may give rise to liability under the UCL, a jury could very well find that Defendant violated section 17200 without also finding that it violated the FLSA. As such, Plaintiffs’ UCL claim does not depend upon the resolution of a question of federal law.

Id. **3-4.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Chicago Sued Over BlackBerry Overtime

In Other Cases of Interest on August 14, 2010 at 1:00 pm

A  Chicago police sergeant has brought an FLSA collective action against the city for overtime pay related to the off-hours use of his BlackBerry PDA device.  The complaint in Allen v. City of Chicago, No. 10-CV-03183, was filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.  You can view the complaint here.

Photo by Cheon Fong Liew

The complaint alleges that it is brought by a Chicago Police Sergeant on behalf of himself and other similarly situated members of the Chicago Police Department for purposes of obtaining relief under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as amended, 29 U.S.C. §201, et. seq. (hereinafter “FLSA”) for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, declaratory and/or injunctive relief, and/or any such other relief the Court may deem appropriate.

Defendant has willfully violated the FLSA by intentionally failing and refusing to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees all compensation due them under the FLSA and its implementing regulations over the course of the last three years. Defendant administered an unlawful compensation system that failed to provide hourly compensation and premium overtime compensation to employees that work overtime hours “off the clock.” Plaintiff and similarly situated employees were issued personal data assistants (“PDA’s”), such as BlackBerry devices, that they are required to use outside their normal working hours without receiving any compensation for such hours. Defendant’s deliberate failure to compensate its Chicago Police Department employees for these hours worked violates federal law as set forth in FSLA.

The plaintiff’s attorneys are MaryAnn Pohl and Paul D. Geiger.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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