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Posts Tagged ‘Superior Court of Los Angeles County’

After Substantial Litigation and Full Arbitration, Second District Reverses Order Compelling Arbitration Finding That Defendants Waived Right to Arbitrate

In Uncategorized on November 15, 2010 at 9:23 am
Day 222 (Or is this Day 1 now?) - Oops!
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The Second District Court of Appeal reversed an order compelling arbitration after the conclusion of an arbitration and judicial confirmation of the arbitration award because defendants waived their right to arbitrate.  Knight v. Toe Brights, Inc., et al., No. B220648, 2010 WL 4542324 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Nov. 12, 2010).

Background

Plaintiff Knight filed an action against her former employer, Toe Brights, Inc. (TBI), and two of its officers/directors/stockholders, alleging that they failed to pay her more than $9,000 in salary and reimbursement for expenses that was due at the time of her termination, and also failed to repay a loan from her to TBI in the amount of $41,783. Id. TBI filed its answer to Knight’s complaint, and alleged as an affirmative defense that “Plaintiff’s action is barred by any arbitration agreement requiring that this action be arbitrated.”  Id.

Defendants moved to compel arbitration about eight months after plaintiff Knight filed her suit.  Id. *1.  By that time, defendants had propounded multiple sets of discovery to which Knight had responded, and numerous discovery motions were pending.  Id. Defendants had claimed “priority” in discovery, and then refused to respond to Knight’s discovery.  Id. The court ordered the matter to arbitration less than three months before the date set for trial. Id.

The case proceeded through arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded Knight $40,000 for the repayment of her loan plus “interest at the statutory rate from the date she filed her lawsuit”.  Id. *4. Knight did not prevail on her other claims for unauthorized use of her jewelry designs, name and likeness, and the arbitrator awarded defendants $60,000 in attorney fees and $1,160 in filing fees as the prevailing parties on some of Knight’s claims. Id. The arbitrator denied Knight’s motion for attorney fees  and costs. Id. Read the rest of this entry »

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DFEH Charge Does Not Toll Statute of Limitations Under the Labor Code

In Statutes of Limitation on October 19, 2010 at 12:30 pm
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The Court of Appeal for the Second District held that a “DFEH complaint will [not] toll the statute on a claim for unpaid wages under the Labor Code.”  Parvizian v. California Department of Transportation, No. B215608, 2010 WL 4012070 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Oct. 14, 2010).

Background

Plaintiff-appellant Syrus Parvizian brought a suit against his former employer, respondent State of California Department of Transportation (“DOT”).  Id. *1.  The operative first amended complaint brought six causes of action, titled Damages for Violation of Statutory Duty to Pay Wages and Compensation, Unpaid Wages, Accounting, Conversion, Money Had and Received, and Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation in Violation of Government Code section 12940.  Id. DOT’s demurrer was sustained with leave to amend as to the causes of action for Damages of Violation of the Statutory Duty to Pay Wages and Compensation, Accounting, Conversion, and Money Had and Received.  Id. The court ruled that the claims were not properly pled, noting that “the state can only be sued if it authorizes a lawsuit, and you don’t plead the proper statutory authority to do so.”  Id. The court overruled the demurrer to the cause of action for unpaid wages, which was brought under Labor Code sections 201 and 202. Id. The court found that the cause of action for violation of Government Code section 12940 had been dismissed with prejudice in the earlier case, and sustained the demurrer as to that cause of action without leave to amend. Id. Plaintiff elected not to amend his complaint, and DOT filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the cause of action under the Labor Code, on the defense of statute of limitations.  Id. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Id.

Statute of Limitations Read the rest of this entry »

Second District Holds That, Pending Brinker, Employer Has a Duty to Provide Meal Breaks “as a Practical Matter”

In Meal and Rest Breaks on August 26, 2010 at 8:41 pm
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While the California Supreme Court will resolve this issue shortly, in Brookler v. Radioshack Corp., B212893, 2010 WL 3341816 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Aug. 26, 2010), an unpublished opinion issued today, the Second District Court of Appeal held that “Unless and until our Supreme Court holds otherwise, we agree with the analysis in Cicairos which held an employer’s obligation under the Labor Code and related wage orders is to do more than simply permit meal breaks in theory; it must also provide them as a practical matter.”

Morry Brookler filed a class action complaint against Radioshack for its alleged failure to provide employees with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes during a work period of more than five hours.  Id. *1.  The trial court certified the class. Radioshack filed a second motion for decertification after issuance of the opinion in Brinker, 165 Cal. App. 4th 25 which the trial court granted. The California Supreme Court granted review in Brinker and the matter is currently pending. Read the rest of this entry »

New Trial Granted for Arguing to Jury That Future Wages Are Recoverable Even After Resignation

In Trial on August 16, 2010 at 6:00 am

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In an unreported opinion, Wolfson v. Tukatech, Inc., 2010 WL 3170521 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Aug. 12, 2010), the Second District Court of Appeal considered whether a new trial was correctly ordered after plaintiff’s attorney argued to the jury about plaintiff’s right to recover for his future wages.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the new trial order because the “record supports the trial court’s finding that Wolfson’s trial counsel committed prejudicial misconduct when arguing to the jury about Wolfson’s right to recover for his future wages”.

The court held that the plaintiff’s attorney misstated the law by “repeatedly argu[ing] unauthorized instructions whose flaws should have been obvious, even after repeated objections to those instructions were sustained”; thus, the court held “that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion by finding that misconduct occurred.” Read the rest of this entry »